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Introduction 
One of simple delights of modern life is The Great British Bake Off, a television 
programme.  With its lesbian presenters and (certainly in the last few series) a 
minimum of one openly gay competitor, with its range of ethnicities and genders, and 
the space it makes for the disabled, the programme makes palpable the concept of 
pluralism, defined by the European Court of Human Rights as the “harmonious 
interaction of persons and groups with varied identities”, to be encouraged as the 
“hallmark of a democratic society” which is “essential for achieving social cohesion”.1  
The programme also suggests that bakers are, as a class, nice people. 
Our laws and cosy television are admirable in their embracing of the LGBT 
community to an extent unthinkable twenty years ago.  The reality for many 
individuals is far less comfortable.  Gay and lesbian people still suffer discrimination, 
bullying, violence, even while the law prohibits all of that.  Our culture has for 
centuries been ingrained with deep social prejudice against, and demonization of, 
gay and lesbian people and that will not disappear completely just because the law 
now requires it.  LGBT individuals continue to choose to silence themselves, to seek 
privacy and invisibility, or otherwise to modify their behaviour, as a means of 
avoiding the hurt and humiliation caused by the prejudice, contempt and even hatred 
that some people still show against them.  Concealment of sexuality is now 
recognised as having deleterious psychological and emotional effects, manifested in 
                                            
1 Baczkovski v Poland (2009) 48 EHRR 19 at paras. 62-63.  In this case the Court found a breach of 
article 11 when the Mayor of Warsaw banned, for no good reason, a gay pride march.  The same 
conclusion was reached more recently in Alekseyev & Ors v Russia 27th November 2018 (application 
No. 14988/09). 
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higher suicide and self-harming rates.2  LGBT people continue to experience higher 
levels of homelessness amongst young adults,3 and much higher instances of 
bullying at school, in social media and in the workplace.4  Yet even in the light of all 
of this it remains an acceptable, even respectable, political position to hold that 
opposite-sex relationships are necessarily superior to same-sex relationships, in the 
way that it is no longer acceptable to profess that the white race is superior to all 
others, or that men are inherently superior to women.  Said to be a political position, 
in fact it is one professed only by those whose political views are manifestations of 
their religious beliefs.  Not all religious believers adopt negative views of gay people, 
but virtually no-one with such views traces them to any source other than religion. 
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to freedom 
of religion or belief, though that protection has limits.  In R (Williamson) v Secretary 
of State for Education5  Lord Nichols said that to engage article 9 the belief must be 
one that is “consistent with basic standards of human dignity and integrity”.  The 
belief in white supremacy would not meet that test; the belief in the inferiority of 
homosexuality probably would.  In Re Christian Institute’s Application for Judicial 
Review6 Weatherup J rejected the argument that a belief in the inherent wrongness 
of homosexual relations would necessarily fail Lord Nichols’ test.  The recent 
decision of the Supreme Court in Ashers Baking Company Ltd v Lee is an example 
of how the law still grants legitimacy to religious beliefs in the sinfulness of LGBT 
people.  Ashers Baking Company Ltd was funded throughout the litigation by the 
Christian Institute. 
                                            
2 K. Schreiber “Why Are Suicide Rates Higher Among LGBTQ Youth?” blog posted October 12, 2017, 
on the website of Psychology Today UK. 
3 “Why Are So Many Young LGBT People in Britain Homeless?” The Big Issue July 26, 2017. 
4 L. Hollins and S. McCalla “Bullied Back into the Closet: Displacement of LGBT Employees Facing 
Workplace Bullying” (2013) 4 Journal of Psychological Issues in Organizational Culture 6. 
5 [2005] UKHL 15 at [23]. 
6 [2008] IRLR36 at [50]. 
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The Facts, and the Lower Courts’ Decisions 
Mr Lee, a gay man living in Northern Ireland, wished to purchase a cake from a 
bakery in Belfast, and to have it decorated with the palpably political slogan “Support 
Gay Marriage”.  The bakery, which was owned and operated by a company, Ashers 
Baking Company, Ltd (itself owned by Mr and Mrs McArthur) offered a cake 
decorating service to the public, and that decorating often included words piped into 
the icing (“Happy Birthday”, and the like).  The McArthurs knew the mind of God and 
knew that for Him the only acceptable form of sexual expression was that between a 
man and a woman within marriage, and that for Him the only acceptable form of 
marriage was that between a man and a woman.  This is, in fact, pretty orthodox 
religious belief.  The McArthurs refused Mr Lee’s order.  Mr Lee sued for 
discrimination, the applicable legislation rendering it unlawful to treat someone less 
well in the provision of goods and services because of either their sexual orientation 
or their religious belief or political opinion. 
The Belfast County Court7 held that the McArthurs were guilty of direct discrimination 
on both these grounds, notwithstanding the finding in fact that the order would 
similarly have been refused had it been placed by a non-gay person, and 
notwithstanding that the bakery was willing to serve gay customers.  The Northern 
Ireland Court of Appeal8 held that there had been direct discrimination on the ground 
of sexual orientation and so there was no need to address any other issue.  The 
case was one, they held, of “associative direct discrimination”, that is to say Mr Lee 
had had his order refused because of his perceived or assumed or actual 
association with persons who have a protected characteristic under the Equality Act 
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2006.9  It was as much 
                                            
7 [2015] NICty 2. 
8 [2016] NICA 39. 
9 SI 2006/439. 
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discrimination to treat Mr Lee less favourably because he associated with gay people 
as it was discrimination to treat Mr Lee less favourably because he was himself gay. 
The matter then went to the United Kingdom Supreme Court, which addressed both 
the claim based on sexual orientation discrimination and that based on discrimination 
on the ground of religious or political belief.  Lady Hale spoke for the Court on the 
substantive issue (while Lord Mance spoke for the Court on the issue of jurisdiction, 
which is not the subject of this note). 
 
The Signature Challenge: the Sexual Orientation Claim 
In relation to the sexual orientation claim (based on the Equality Act (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2006), the Supreme Court found that the 
basis of the McArthurs’ objection to Mr Lee’s order was the message, and not the 
man: the man would have been served as any other customer had he not insisted on 
the message, and any other customer would have been refused had they ordered 
the message irrespective of their sexual orientation.  From that finding it followed that 
there had been no direct discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation, with the 
result that “this was a case of associative discrimination or it was nothing” (per Lady 
Hale, at para. 34).  But there would only be associative direct discrimination if 
refusing to give the message was so inherently associated with a protected 
characteristic of the man that it was in reality a proxy for that characteristic, or an 
excuse to discriminate against that man.  Lady Hale gave as an example of this form 
of discrimination the case of Preddy v Bull10 where the Supreme Court had held that 
limiting double rooms in a hotel to married couples was indissociable from 
discrimination against gay people because at that time gay couples could not be 
married.  But in the present case, as Lady Hale said (para. 25), “support for gay 
marriage is not a proxy for any particular sexual orientation” since many people of 
various orientations support that cause; indeed, she suggested, the whole of society 
                                            
10 [2013] UKSC 73. 
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benefits from the message (para. 33).  The complete absence of evidence to 
suggest that the refusal to supply the cake and message was because Mr Lee was 
thought to be or to associate with gay people meant that the case could not be seen 
as one of associative direct discrimination.  This part of the claim failed. 
While this reasoning is defensible, the limits of the decision need to be very clearly 
understood.  There was no discrimination because there was no necessary 
association between the message on the cake and the man who ordered the cake.  
This does not give bakers carte blanche to refuse to supply cakes to the gay 
community, even when they “carry” a message.  Often the cake and what it 
represents will indeed be indissociable from the person ordering it, or that person’s 
protected characteristic.  In the US Supreme Court case of Masterpiece Cakeshop 
Ltd v Colorado Civil Rights Commission11 a baker had refused a gay man’s order for 
a wedding cake, one which carried no logo supporting any cause, but simply for the 
man’s own wedding – to another man.  Two members of the Court (Justices Thomas 
and Gorsuch) accepted the baker’s argument that creating a wedding cake was an 
expressive statement that engaged his free speech rights protected by the First 
Amendment, though in the end it was the failure of the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission to deal with the case with the required religious neutrality that led to the 
Supreme Court rejecting the discrimination claim.  In Lee v Ashers Baking Co Ltd 
Lady Hale sought to distance herself from the potential implications of that decision 
(paras. 59-62), on the ground that what she had to decide was a different issue.  
Applying the reasoning she adopted, the question would become whether supplying 
a cake for a same-sex wedding was indissociable from the couple getting married, or 
their sexual orientation.  The answer is surely yes, and the refusal unlawful, if the 
baker offered wedding cakes only to opposite-sex couples, for that decision is being 
made on the basis of the couple’s actual or perceived sexual orientation.  It follows 
that bakers in this country cannot lawfully refuse to supply wedding cakes to gay 
couples if they are in the business of supplying wedding cakes at all. 
                                            
11 4th June 2018, US Supreme Court. 
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The same applies to any person offering services associated with weddings – the 
venue and victuals supplier, the chauffeur, the caterer, the photographer, the baker, 
the honeymoon hotelier – who may well have a deep-seated religious belief in the 
inherent inferiority of same-sex relationships and in the illegitimacy of same-sex 
marriages, and a deep discomfort in being asked to “normalise” or “make socially 
respectable” that which they consider to be abnormal and socially unacceptable, or 
unacceptable to their god.  But just as they could not refuse to provide their services 
to, say, a mixed race couple because of their discomfort with and disapproval of 
miscegenation, so they cannot refuse to provide their services to a same-sex couple 
– even if their contribution, with its message of social acceptability, adds to the 
legitimacy of what they believe to be illegitimate.  The celebrant is in a rather 
different position, because he or she is involved not with the wedding but with the 
marriage.  No registrar can refuse to solemnise a same-sex marriage or a civil 
partnership,12 but ministers and priests are explicitly permitted to do so under the 
marriage legislation in both Scotland and England and Wales (the clerical question 
not arising, of course, in Northern Ireland where only civil civil (sic) partnership is 
available to same-sex couples). 
The law does not force any person to offer goods and services to the public: it 
merely insists that they be offered without discrimination.  Any supplier who cannot 
reconcile that with their own conscience is entirely free to leave the business of 
supplying goods and services.  Most business people, of course, reconcile their 
beliefs with the needs of their businesses or are able, in the way the McArthurs were 
not, to separate out their business interests from their personal beliefs. 
 
The Technical Challenge: the Political Opinion Claim 
                                            
12 Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357; Eweida v United Kingdom [2013] 
ECHR 37. 
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The message on the cake clearly amounted to the expression of a political opinion, 
held by Mr Lee, but it was the refusal by the McArthurs to print that message that 
was alleged to amount to their treating Mr Lee less favourably because of his 
political opinion, contrary to the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) 
Order 1998.13  So this aspect of the case engaged and indeed turned on the 
McArthurs’ freedom of thought, conscience and religion (as protected by article 9 of 
the ECHR) and, in particular, their freedom of expression (protected by article 10) 
rather than on Mr Lee’s political belief in same-sex marriage (protected under the 
Fair Employment and Treatment Order). 
It is well settled that both the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and 
the right to freedom of expression include not only the right to hold and express 
political views but also the right not to be forced to hold or express political views that 
one does not hold or wish to express.  Lady Hale (at paras. 50-52) referred to a 
number of cases illustrating this point.  In Buscarini v San Marino,14 the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that it was a violation of 
article 9 to oblige non-believers to swear a Christian oath as a condition of remaining 
members of Parliament. The court held that freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion “entails, inter alia, freedom to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to 
practise or not to practise a religion”.15  Likewise, in the Privy Council case of 
Commodore of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force v Laramore,16 the Board held, in 
Lady Hale’s words, “that a Muslim petty officer had been hindered in the exercise of 
his constitutional right to freedom of conscience when he was obliged, on pain of 
disciplinary action, to remain present and doff his cap during Christian prayers at 
ceremonial parades and at morning and evening colours. This was a sufficiently 
active participation to hinder the claimant in the enjoyment of his conscientious 
                                            
13 SI 1998/3162 (NI 21). 
14 (1999) 30 EHRR 208. 
15 (1999) 30 EHRR 208 at [34]. 
16 [2017] UKPC 13; [2017] 1 WLR 2752. 
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beliefs. Nor had any justification been shown for it.”  These two cases involved 
religious beliefs but the same was held to apply to political views in RT (Zimbabwe) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department,17 where Lord Dyson said: “Nobody 
should be forced to have or express a political opinion in which he does not believe.” 
In the present case the Supreme Court held that if the law penalised the McArthurs 
for refusing to decorate the cake with words they disagreed with, that would amount 
to the law forcing them to express a political opinion that they do not hold, which 
would be an infringement of both articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention.  
They concluded that the law did not prevent the McArthurs from refusing to do so.  
How they came to that conclusion is far less persuasive than the conclusion the 
Court reached on the sexual orientation claim, for it suffers from at least three 
substantial weaknesses. 
First, it was assumed throughout – not least by the McArthurs – that providing a cake 
with a message amounted to the suppliers endorsing the message, or at the very 
least expressing the view contained in the words “Support Gay Marriage”.  This 
assumption is flawed.  The Royal Mail is not endorsing or even expressing the views 
of political parties who use its services to distribute their propaganda: it is simply 
providing a medium.  Broadcasters are not themselves expressing a view when they 
give airtime to those who offer opinions.  No-one really believes that a shop selling 
cards, or cakes, with “Happy Birthday” on them is itself expressing birthday greetings 
to anyone.  But this point was dismissed by Lady Hale (at para. 54): “There is no 
requirement that the person who is compelled to speak can only complain if he is 
thought by others to support the message.  Mrs McArthur may have been worried 
that others would see the Ashers logo on the cake box and think that they supported 
the campaign.  But that is by the way: what matters is that by being required to 
produce the cake they were being required to express a message with which they 
deeply disagreed.”  But it is, at the very least, not obvious that the shop owners were 
“expressing” any view at all by the act of selling a cake with words on it.  Still less are 
                                            
17 [2012] UKSC 38 at [42]. 
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bakers expressing a view when they supply wedding cakes for same-sex weddings.  
Such a cake may well carry an important message – of social acceptability, of moral 
equivalence, of legitimate love, of the toleration of pluralism – but it is not the making 
or the selling of the cake that expresses that message but the use to which it is put.  
And that use is in the hands of the purchaser, not the seller. 
The second weakness is that in the cases Lady Hale cites, the obligation to express 
a view was explicitly imposed by the state or its (armed) agents.  In the present case, 
even if we concede for argument’s sake that fulfilling Mr Lee’s order amounted to the 
bakers’ expression of an opinion, the obligation imposed by the state on the 
suppliers of goods and services was not a requirement to express a view, but to offer 
their services in a non-discriminatory fashion.  Lady Hale nevertheless found (at para 
62) a state-imposed obligation from the fact that if their refusal to “express” a view 
was unlawful then they would be exposed to civil liability for that discrimination: “If 
and to the extent that there was discrimination on grounds of political opinion, no 
justification has been shown for the compelled speech which would be entailed for 
imposing civil liability for refusing to fulfil the order.”  In other words, the imposition of 
sanctions for not obeying the law is the state forcing people to do what they might 
not want to do.  Yes indeed, but that takes us nowhere.  In the decisions cited by 
Lady Hale there was no legitimate aim to the requirement to express a view.  But a 
law prohibiting discrimination has an obviously legitimate aim, and a requirement to 
provide goods and services that are not in themselves unlawful has a clear rational 
connection to that aim.  Though the state may have the onus of showing that the aim 
of a particular law is legitimate, it is not for the state to justify compelling someone to 
follow any law that has a legitimate aim: rather, it is for the person claiming an 
exemption from the general law to show why they should be free to do what the rest 
of the population are not.  Such claims have frequently been held in the past not to 
be valid if based simply on the subjectivities of religious belief.18  The refusal of the 
late Ms Ladele (also funded by the Christian Institute) to moderate her views on 
                                            
18 See McLintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs [2008] IRLR 29; Ladele v London Borough 
Council of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357; McFarlane v Relate (Avon) Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 771 
(esp at [24]); Preddy v Bull [2013] UKSC 73. 
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same-sex marriage and civil partnership in the performance of her employment 
duties led to her dismissal from her position as district registrar, and this was found 
lawful by both the Court of Appeal and the European Court of Human Rights 
because imposing that penalty pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring the 
registration service was provided in a non-discriminatory manner:19 so too a supplier 
of goods and services ought to be obliged to provide what they offer to the public 
without discrimination, even in circumstances when that provision is contrary to their 
personal belief that discrimination is justified. 
It is common and acceptable for the law to prohibit some forms of speech if such a 
prohibition serves a legitimate state interest: prohibitions on hate speech, for 
example (including expressions of hatred on the ground of sexual orientation20), or 
on defamation, or extreme pornography, are all permissible and exemptions cannot 
be claimed on the ground that staying silent is contrary to a person’s profound 
beliefs.  Less common, but equally legitimate, are requirements on individuals to 
speak even when they would rather not, so long as important public purposes are 
served thereby.  Requiring district registrars to express the law’s acceptance of civil 
partnership and same-sex marriage is not the only example of this.  Witnesses in a 
court of law have similarly no right to refuse to answer questions asked of them.  
Likewise, various bodies are statutorily obliged to bring information they hold about 
children to the attention of the relevant authorities in cases of suspected child 
neglect.21  A bishop who takes a priest’s confession of child sex abuse may well 
consider that to speak out would be contrary to his profound religious beliefs, but if 
the law insisted he speak out (as it does if he is cited as a witness in a court of law22) 
                                            
19 The French magazine L’Obs reported on 17th October 2018 that the European Court of Human 
Rights had on 4th October 2018 rejected as manifestly ill-founded a claim by various registrars in 
France that their article 9 rights were being infringed by the legal requirement that they conduct 
marriages for same-sex couples. 
20 Public Order Act 1986, s. 29AB, as inserted by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 
21 See for example ss. 60 and 61 of the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 which oblige local 
authorities and the police to pass information to the children’s reporter. 
22 McLaughlin v Douglas and Kidston (1863) 4 Irv. 273. 
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then his right of silence as part of the right of free speech is not being illegitimately 
interfered with.  Nor would holding him civilly liable for the harm caused by his failure 
to speak out breach the ECHR.  To require someone to obey a law that serves 
legitimate purposes is not an illegitimate breach of their rights either to speak or not 
to speak.  To further equality, and a society in which minority groups feel as free to 
express themselves as majority groups, is a legitimate aim of anti-discrimination 
legislation, and an exemption therefrom must be based on more than a personal 
belief drawn from a source that deliberately eschews rationality. 
A third weakness in Lady Hale’s reasoning is her curt dismissal (at para 57) of the 
argument that Ashers Baking Corporation Ltd, which as an artificial entity clearly is 
incapable of itself holding political opinions or religious beliefs, could not rely on 
articles 9 and 10.  It was the company with whom the contract for sale and for 
services was to be entered into; it was the company who had a direct financial 
interest.  Lady Hale accepted that a limited company could not rely on articles 9 and 
10 but she dismissed the point as irrelevant on the ground that to hold the company 
liable would be to negative the McArthurs’ Convention rights – because the 
McArthurs owned the company.  That rather rips open the corporate veil, and does 
so without any attempt at analysis of corporate law. 
 
Conclusion: the Showstopper 
There is an unfortunate undercurrent throughout the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Ashers Baking Company Ltd v Lee: that all protected characteristics are of equal 
weight, at least, according to Lady Hale (at para. 14), to the extent that publicly 
funded bodies should treat them equally.  But they are not all equally worthy of 
protection.  Some characteristics are in need of more protection than others because 
of a long history of discrimination; some characteristics demand more protection 
because they are immutable (race, for example, and sexual orientation); others are 
chosen but not necessarily based on rational choice (political beliefs, religious 
beliefs).  Opinions can change but skin colour cannot.  (Your commentator does not 
subscribe to the view that religious believers have no choice but to follow the 
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precepts of the religious confession to which they belong, nor that religious doctrine 
is immutable). 
While the sexual orientation claim was easily, and correctly, dismissed because the 
refusal to fulfil Mr Lee’s order was based on the message and not who wanted it, the 
dismissal of the claim based on political opinion is, for the reasons given above, far 
less persuasive.  It will give hope, and even encouragement, to those who would 
refuse, if the law allows it, services relating to gay marriages and to LGBT individuals 
generally.  The courts will face further questions in the future as to where the line is 
to be drawn between explicit and implicit messages, between dissociable and 
indissociable connections: this very fact reminds us that members of the LGBT 
community even today face challenges in leading their lives as openly and as fully as 
non-LGBT people, notwithstanding the strengths of modern anti-discrimination 
legislation in this country.  The law has its role to play not only in creating an equality 
framework but also in changing hearts and minds, in giving as clearly as it can the 
message of moral equivalence between different sexual orientations.  So too does 
the highest court in the land.  In that place Lady Hale has probably done more than 
any other judge to “normalise” same-sex relationships, and in the present case (at 
para. 35) she recognises the harm done to those peculiarly susceptible to 
discriminatory treatment in her comment that “it is deeply humiliating, and an affront 
to human dignity, to deny someone a service because of that person’s race, gender, 
disability, sexual orientation or any of the other protected personal characteristics”.  
Though she concluded that that is not what happened in this case, her acceptance 
that the McArthurs’ negative opinions of gay relationships are as entitled to respect 
as positive opinions will be heard, and acted upon, by those who feel moral 
superiority over anyone who is different to themselves. 
It is LGBT people who will continue bear the brunt of this all too familiar humiliation, 
this contempt and even hatred, and relief will only come when both society and the 
law equate homophobia with racism, antisemitism and other political views that are 
simply beyond the pale and worthy only of the law’s contempt.  Until then, we must 
find comfort in the safety of our own homes, and dream of the world as it ought to be, 
where no-one dislikes us, or thinks themselves superior to us, because of who we 
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are or how their god made us: the world, in other words, of mixing bowls and ovens, 
of pavlova, petits fours and puits d’amour, of good and tolerant and diverse people, 
the world of The Great British Bake Off. 
